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Introduction

Metropolitan areas in the US are characterized by enormous differences in average income,
earnings, and factor productivity. The income of individuals located in metropolitan areas
at the top of the income distribution is more than double the income of observationally
similar individuals located in metropolitan areas at the bottom of the distribution. These
differences reflect, at least in part, variation in local productivity.
Metropolitan areas in the US are also characterized by enormous differences in cost of
living. These differences in cost of living are mostly due to differences in the cost of land
and therefore housing. For example, the average cost of housing in metropolitan areas like
Anniston, AL or Decatur, AL is about half of the average cost of housing in metropolitan
areas like Naples, FL or Atlanta, GA. The existing data on average income by city or state
do not take into account these cost of living differences, and therefore provide a potentially
inaccurate picture of the geographical distribution of households with a low standard of living. Additionally, even within a metropolitan area, different income groups may be exposed
to different price levels, if for example, retailers are less available in poor areas, or if the poor
have higher search costs because of lack of transportation. Also, to the extent that high and
low income households are not distributed uniformly across metropolitan areas, differences
in cost of living will also affect our existing aggregate measures of inequality.
When thinking about differences in income across localities, we are presumably interested
in measures that reflect differences in standard of living across households. When designing
public assistance programs that help the poor, we are presumably interested in targeting
groups with a low standard of living. In this respect, measures of income and income
inequality that account for differences in cost of living are important for policy because they
are a arguably better measures of differences in standard of living than the nominal measures
that are currently used. The measures of income and income inequality that are currently
used fail to take into account the fact that different income groups face different cost of living
trends.
In this report, I seek to re-examine how inequality across metropolitan areas and across
skill groups is measured and how it should be interpreted. I investigate the effect that
accounting for cost of living differences has on existing measures of differences across cities
and between skill groups in income and wages.
Specifically, I propose two measures of local cost of living in order to adjust existing
measures of differences in income levels across metropolitan areas and existing measures of
inequality across skill groups.
My empirical finding indicate that accounting for cost of living differences significantly
reduces income differences across metropolitan areas and significantly reduces measures of
inequality across skill groups. I then present a theoretical framework that is useful in interpreting my empirical findings and draw policy implications.
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2

Consumer Price Indexes and Income Distribution

There is vast heterogeneity in the cost of living experienced by different households in
the US. Differences in cost of living arise from differences in cost of housing across areas
and difference in the consumption of non-housing goods and services. Not all workers are
exposed to the same changes in cost of living because (i) they may not live in the same areas
and therefore they may experience different changes in housing prices; (ii) they may not
consume the same bundle of goods and (iii) may not have access to the same set of retailers.
For example, some authors have hypothesized that poor households without cars have
lower mobility than rich households and therefore face higher search costs for consumption
goods. Lower mobility may result in more limited access to discount retailers and therefore
higher cost of purchasing non-durable goods and services (for example: food and groceries)
as well as durable goods (for example: household appliances, etc). If this is true, it implies
that poor households face higher cost of living and their real earnings may be even smaller
than their nominal earnings (relative to rich households).
In this case, real poverty and inequality are even larger than the existing measures would
suggest, because the existing measures are based on nominal income and earnings and do
not account for differences in the price of consumption goods.
On the other hand, there may be differences in cost of living that arise from geographical
differences. For example, skilled workers are overrepresented in metropolitan areas that have
a high cost of housing, while unskilled workers are overrepresented in metropolitan areas that
have low cost of housing. This implies that skilled workers are exposed to a higher cost of
housing and that their real relative wage may be smaller than their nominal relative wage.
In this case, real inequality is smaller than the existing measures of inequality.

2.1

The Official CPI

A cost of living index seeks to measure changes over time in the amount that consumers
need to spend to reach a certain utility level or “standard of living.” Changes in the official
Consumer Price Index between period t and t + 1 as measured by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics are a weighted average of changes in the price of the goods in a representative
consumption basket. The basket is the original consumption basket at time t, and the
weights reflect the share of income that the average consumer spends on each good at time
t.
One well known problem with the CPI is the potential for substitution bias, which is the
possibility that consumers respond to price changes by substituting relatively cheaper goods
for goods that have become more expensive. While the actual consumption baskets may
change, the CPI reports inflation for the original basket. Details of the BLS methodology
are described in Chapter 17 of the Handbook of Methods (BLS, 2007), titled “The Consumer
Price Index”.
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Appendix table 1 shows the relative importance of the main aggregate components of the
CPI-U in 2000. The largest component by far is housing. In 2000, housing accounts for more
than 42% of the CPI-U. The largest sub-components of housing costs are “Shelter” and “Fuel
and Utilities”. The second and third main components of the CPI-U are transportation and
food. They only account for 17.2% and 14.9% of the CPI-U, respectively. The weights of all
the other categories are 6% or smaller.
Although most households in the US are homeowners, changes in the price of housing
are measured by the BLS using changes in the cost of renting an apartment (Poole, Ptacek
and Verbugge, 2006; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). The rationale for using rental costs
instead of home prices is that rental costs are a better approximation of the user cost of housing. Since houses are an asset, their price reflects both the user cost as well as expectations
of future appreciation.
Rental costs vary significantly across metropolitan areas. For example, in 2000, the
average rental cost for a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment in San Diego, CA—the city at the 90th
percentile of the distribution—is $894. This rental cost is almost 3 times higher than the
rental cost for an equally sized apartment in Decatour, AL, the city at the 10th percentile.
Changes over time in rental costs also vary significantly across metropolitan areas. For
example, between 1980 and 2000, the rental cost increased by $165 in Johnstown, PA—one
of the cities at the bottom of the distribution—and by $892 in San Jose—one of the cities at
the top of the distribution. The distribution of average rental costs and changes in average
rental costs are shown in Figure 1.
Although the cost of living varies substantially across metropolitan areas, wage and income are typically deflated using a single, nation-wide deflator, such as the CPI-U calculated
by the BLS. The use a nation-wide deflator is particularly striking in light of the fact that
more than 40% of the CPI-U is driven by housing costs , and that housing costs vary so
much across locations (Figure 1).
To investigate the role of cost of living differences on income and wage differences across
cities and between skill groups, I propose two alternative CPI indexes that vary across
metropolitan areas. I closely follow the methodology that the Bureau of Labor Statistics
uses to build the official Consumer Price Index, but I generalize two of its assumptions.

2.2

Local CPI 1

First, I compute a CPI that allows for the fact that the cost of housing varies across
metropolitan areas. I call the resulting local price index “Local CPI 1”. Following the BLS
methodology, I define Local CPI 1 as the properly weighted sum of local cost of housing—with
the average across cities normalized to 1 in 1980—and non-housing consumption—normalized
to 1 in 1980. I measure the cost of housing faced by an individual in metropolitan area c
in two ways. In my preferred specification, I follow the BLS methodology and I use rental
costs. I assign the cost of housing to residents in a metropolitan area based on the relevant
3

average monthly rent. Specifically, I take the average of the monthly cost of renting a 2
or 3 bedroom apartment among all renters in area c. As an alternative way to measure
cost of housing, in some models I use the price of owner occupied houses instead of rental
costs. Specifically, I take the average reported value of all 2 or 3 bedroom owner occupied
single family houses in area c. Both rental costs and housing prices are from the Census of
Population. As I discuss later, empirical results are not sensitive to measuring housing costs
using rental costs or housing prices. The price of non housing goods and services is assumed
to be the same in a given year, irrespective of location. This assumption is relaxed in Local
CPI 2.
The motivation for using 2 and 3 bedroom apartments is to keep the size of the apartment
roughly similar. I have experimented with variants of this selection rule. Estimates based
only on 2 bedroom apartments are similar to the ones presented below. Estimates based
on data from the American Housing Survey that use information on square footage to hold
constant the exact size of the apartment also yield similar results.
It is important to note that this methodology ensures that the deflator that I use for a
given worker does not reflect the increase in the cost of the apartment rented or the cost
of the house owned by that specific worker. Instead, it reflects the increase in the cost of
housing experienced by residents in the same city, irrespective of their own individual housing
cost and irrespective of whether they rent or own.

2.3

Local CPI 2

In local CPI 1, changes in the cost of housing can vary across localities, but changes in
the cost of non-housing goods and services are assumed to be the same everywhere. While
the cost of housing is the most important component of the CPI, the price of other goods
and services is likely to vary systematically with the cost of housing. In cities where land
is more expensive, production and retail costs are higher and therefore the cost of many
goods and services is higher. For example, a slice of pizza or a hair cut are likely to be more
expensive in New York city than in Indianapolis, since it is more expensive to operate a
pizza restaurant or a barber shop in New York city than Indianapolis.
Local CPI 2 allows for both the cost of housing and the cost of non-housing consumption to vary across metropolitan areas. Systematic, high quality, city-level data on the
price of non-housing good and services are not available for most cities over a long time
period. To overcome this limitation, I use two alternative approaches. First, in my preferred specification, I use the fact that the BLS releases a local CPI for a limited number
of metropolitan areas. This local CPI is not ideal because of the 315 MSA’s in the 2000
Census, the metropolitan-level CPI is made available by the BLS only for 23 MSA’s in the
period under consideration. Additionally, it is normalized to 1 in a given year, thus precluding cross-sectional comparisons. However, it can still be used to impute the part of local
non-housing prices that varies systematically with housing costs. The local CPI computed
4

by the BLS for city c in year t is a weighted average of housing cost (HPct ) and non-housing
costs (NHPct ): BLSct = wHPct + (1 − w)NHPct where w is the CPI weight used by BLS for
housing. Non-housing costs can be divided in two components:
NHPct = πHPct + vct

(1)

where πHPct is the component of non-housing costs that varies systematically with housing costs; and vct is the component that is orthogonal to housing costs. If π > 0 it means that
cities with higher cost of housing also have higher costs of non-housing goods and services.
I use the small sample of MSA’s for which a local BLS CPI is available to estimate π.
To do so, I first regress changes in the BLS local index on changes in housing costs:
∆BLSct = β∆HPct + ect . Estimating this regression in differences is necessary because
BLSct is normalized to 1 in a given year. While cross-sectional comparisons based on BLSct
are meaningless, BLSct does measure changes in prices within a city. Once I have an estimate
. Empirically, β̂ is equal to .588 (.001) and π̂ is equal to .35 in
of β, I can calculate π̂ = β̂−w
1−w
2000.
I then impute the systematic component of non-housing costs to all MSA’s, based on
their housing cost: E(NHPct |HPct ) = π̂HPct . Finally, I compute “Local CPI 2” as a properly
weighted sum of the cost of housing, the component of non-housing costs that varies with
housing (π̂HPct), and the component of non-housing costs that does not vary with housing.
As an alternative strategy to measure local variation in non-housing prices, I use data on
non-housing prices taken from the Accra dataset, which is collected by the Council for Community and Economic Research.1 The Accra data have both advantages and disadvantages.
On one hand, the Accra data are available for most cities, and therefore do not require any
imputation. Furthermore, the detail is such that price information is available at the level
of specific consumption goods and the price is not normalized to a base year. On the other
hand, the Accra data are available only for a very limited number of goods.2 Importantly,
the sample size for each good and city is quite small, so that local price averages are noisy.
Additionally, the set of cities covered changes over time. In practice, the empirical findings
based on the version of local CPI 2 that uses the imputation and those based on the version
of local CPI 2 that uses Accra data are similar.
In sum, local CPI 2 is more comprehensive than Local CPI 1 because it includes local
variation in both housing and non-housing costs, but it is has the limitation that non-housing
costs are imputed or come from Accra data. For this reason, in the next Section I present
separate estimates for Local CPI 1 and Local CPI 2.
1

The data were generously provided by Emek Basker. Basker (2005) and Basker and Noel (2007) describe
the Accra dataset in detail.
2
Only 48 goods have prices that are consistently defined for the entire period under consideration. The
BLS basket includes more than 1000 goods.
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2.4

Additional Details

Here I describe in more details on how I compute Local CPI 1 and Local CPI 2. As I
mention above, I follow closely the BLS methodology, and take the properly weighted sum
of changes in the cost of housing and non-housing consumption. Cost of housing is measured
either using rental costs or housing prices. In the first case, my measure of rent is the “gross
monthly rental cost” of the housing unit.
I limit the sample to 2 or 3 bedrooms rental units. This includes contract rent plus
additional costs for utilities (water, electricity, gas) and fuels (oil, coal, kerosene, wood, etc.).
This variable is considered by IPUMS as more comparable across households than “contract
rent”, which may or may not include utilities and fuels. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) also uses the “gross monthly rental cost” measure of rent to
calculate the federally mandated “Fair Market Rent”.
Rents are imputed for top-coded observations by multiplying the value of the top code by
1.3. Results do not change significantly when no imputation is performed or when I multiply
the value of the top code by 1.4. For Local CPI 1, the cost of non-housing consumption is
obtained by subtracting changes in the cost of housing from the nationwide CPI-U computed
by the BLS:
CPI Non-Housing = (CPI-U/(1 − w)) − (w/(1 − w))Housing

(2)

where “Housing” is the average nationwide increase in cost of housing (from Census data)
and w is the BLS housing weight in the relevant year.
The housing costs relevant for a worker living in metropolitan area c—whether he rents
or own—is the average of the monthly cost of renting a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment among
all renters in area c. When cost of housing is measured using housing prices, I use the
property value reported by homeowners of 2 or 3 bedroom single family houses. In this case,
the housing costs relevant for a worker living in metropolitan area c is then the average of
housing values reported by all homeowners of 2 or 3 bedroom homes in area c.
Note that measured changes in cost of housing do not reflect the change in rental cost
or changes in property values at the individual level. Instead, measured changes in cost of
housing reflect an average for the local housing market, irrespective of an individual own
housing cost and irrespective of whether she rents or owns.
As weights, in my baseline specifications I use the expenditure shares that the BLS uses
to compute the official CPI. Since the basket is updated periodically, the BLS weights vary
by year. One concern is that housing expenditure shares may vary across metropolitan areas
because differences in housing prices. Additionally, it is possible that housing expenditure
shares vary across skill groups if preferences are non homotetic. In practice, however, the
use of BLS shares does not appear to introduce a significant bias in my estimates of the local
CPI.
First, consider the possible differences in expenditure shares across metropolitan areas.
6

Since housing costs vary across cities, it is in principle possible that the share of income
spent on housing also vary, as consumers adjust their consumption bundles to local prices.
Empirically, the demand for housing is not very price elastic and the share of income spent
on housing appears to be higher in more expensive cities. In a recent AER paper, Lewbel
and Pendakur (forthcoming) find that a housing price increase of 10 percent results in a 0.63
percentage points higher housing share, everything else constant. If this is true, it implies
that the share of income spent on housing in expensive cities like New York is higher than
the share of income spent on housing in less expensive cities like Indianapolis, everything
else constant. Because college graduates are over-represented in expensive cities like New
York and underrepresented in less expensive cities like Indianapolis, this should increase the
housing share of college graduates relative to high-school graduates, everything else constant.
Second, consider the possibility that housing price elasticity vary by skill level (or income
level). Lewbel and Pendakur find that high income individuals substitute less than low
income individuals in the face of an increase in the price of housing. This should further
increase the housing share of college graduates relative to high-school graduates, everything
else constant.
Third, consider the possibility of non homotetic preferences. Most empirical studies
find that housing is a normal good, with an income elasticity just below 1 when income is
measured as permanent income.3 If this is true, the share of income spent on housing should
be slightly lower for college graduates than high-school graduates.
To account for these possibilities, I have replicated my results using different expenditure
shares for different cities and different skill groups in different years. In particular, I use
available estimates in the literature of price elasticity and income elasticity to impute shares
that vary as a function of local housing prices and individual income. For housing, I assume
a permanent income elasticity equal to .85, which is the mid-point in the range of estimates
provided by Polinsky and Ellwood (1979). I also assume that the percent difference in
permanent income between skilled and unskilled workers is 40% in 1980, 53% in 1990 and
60% in 2000. (These figures reflect estimates of the the nominal college premium.) To allow
for differences across cities as a function of local housing prices, I use estimates of demand
elasticity from Lewbel and Pendakur (AER forthcoming).
Estimates of the college premium based on expenditure shares that vary by MSA, skill
group and year are similar to the ones obtained using BLS shares that vary only by year.
Overall, using a common housing share for all individuals within a year appears not to be
a bad approximation. This is consistent with what reported by Baum-Snow and Pavan
(2009), who find that expenditures shares are generally similar across cities of different size
(and therefore different price level).
3

For example, Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) uncover estimates of permanent income elasticity ranging
from 0.80 to 0.87.
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3

Inequality Across Metropolitan Areas

I use my proposed measured of local cost of living to I investigate how income differences
across metropolitan areas vary when cost of living are taken into account. In this Section, I
focus on data from the 2000 Census of Population. I report my results on individual income.
However, an analysis of yearly earning or monthly earnings or hourly wages all yield very
similar conclusions.
Detailed results by metropolitan area are shown in Table 1. Column 2 reports average
nominal personal income, while column 3 reports average real personal income based on
Local CPI 1. Column 4 reports the percent difference between real and nominal income.
The table illustrates that in cities like San Jose, Stanford and San Francisco, where cost of
living is particularly high, real income is more than 20% below nominal income. By contrast,
in cities like Gadsden, Anniston or Johnstown where cost of living is particularly low, real
income is more than 15% above nominal income.
Because cities with high nomina income tend to have higher cost of living on average,
deflating by local cost of living tends to dramatically lower the geographical dispersion in
mean income across geographical areas.
To see this more systematically, consider that in the 332 metropolitan areas identified in
the 2000 Census of population, the mean personal income by metropolitan area in nominal
dollars is 32,144, while the median personal income is 31575. The standard deviation of the
distribution of nominal income is 6123.1.
The difference between the metropolitan area with the highest average personal income
and the city with the lowest is 57654. The difference between the metropolitan area in top
1% of the average personal income distribution and the metropolitan area in bottom 1% of
the average personal income distribution is 26986. The difference between the metropolitan
area in top 10% of the average personal income distribution and the metropolitan area in
bottom 10% of the average personal income distribution is 14776.
By contrast, the distribution in real terms is much more compressed. For example, deflating nominal income using Local CPI 1—where the average across cities of Local CPI 1
is set equal to 1—I find a standard deviation of the distribution of nominal income equal to
4127.0. The difference between the metropolitan area with the highest average personal income and the city with the lowest is 40004. The difference between the metropolitan area in
top 1% of the average personal income distribution and the metropolitan area in bottom 1%
of the average personal income distribution is 18742. The difference between the metropolitan area in top 10% of the average personal income distribution and the metropolitan area
in bottom 10% of the average personal income distribution is 9812. When using local CPI
2, the increased in the compression of the income distribution across cities is even larger.
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4

Inequality Across Skill Groups

In this Section, I estimate how much of the increase in nominal wage differences between
skilled and unskilled individuals is accounted for by differences in the cost of living.
I use data from the Census of Population and focus on changes between 1980 and 2000 in
the difference in the average hourly wage for workers with a high school degree and workers
with college or more.
I begin by quantifying the changes in the cost of living experienced by high school and
college graduates between 1980 and 2000. The top panel of Table 2 shows changes in the
official CPI-U, as reported by the BLS, and normalized to 1 in 1980. This is the most widely
used measure of inflation, and it is the measure that is almost universally used to deflate
wages and incomes. According to this index, the price level doubled between 1980 and 2000.
This increase is—by construction—the same for college graduates and high school graduates.
The next panel shows the increase in the cost of housing faced by college graduates and
high school graduates. College graduates and high school graduates are exposed to very
different increases in the cost of housing. In 1980 the cost of housing for the average college
graduate is only 4% more than the cost of housing for the average high school graduate.
This gap grows to 11% in 1990 and reaches 14% by 2000. Column 4 indicates that housing
costs for high school and college graduates increased between 1980 and 2000 by 127% and
147%, respectively.
The third panel shows “Local CPI 1”, normalized to 1 in 1980 for the average household.4
The panel shows that in 1980 the overall cost of living experienced by college graduates is
only 2% higher than the cost of living experienced by high school graduates. This difference
increases to 6% by year 2000. The difference in Local CPI 1 between high school and college
graduates is less pronounced than the difference in monthly rent because Local CPI 1 includes
non-housing costs as well as housing costs.
The differential increase in cost of living faced by college graduates relative to high school
graduates is more pronounced when the price of non-housing goods and services is allowed
to vary across locations, as in the bottom panel. In the case of Local CPI 2, the cost of
living is 3% higher for college graduates relative to high school graduates in 1980 and 9%
in 2000. Column 4 indicates that the increase in the overall price level experienced by high
school graduates between 1980 and 2000 is 108%. The increase in the overall price level
experienced by college graduates between 1980 and 2000 is 119%.
The relative increase in the cost of housing experienced by college graduates between
1980 and 2000 can be decomposed into a part due to geographical mobility and a part due
to the fact that already in 1980 college graduates are overrepresented in cities that experience
large increases in costs. Specifically, the 1980-2000 nationwide change in the cost of housing
experienced by skill group j (j=high school or college), can be written as
4

Here I use rental costs to measure housing costs. Using property values for owner occupied houses yields
similar results.
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Pj2000 − Pj1980 =

P

P

ωjc2000 Pc2000 − c ωjc1980 Pc1980
P
P
c ωjc1980 (Pc2000 − Pc1980 )
c (ωjc2000 − ωjc1980 )Pc2000 +
c

where ωjct is the share of workers in skill group j who live in city c in year t and Pct
is the cost of housing in city c in year t. The equation illustrates that the total change
in cost of housing is the sum of two components: a part due to the the change in the
P
share of workers in each city, given 2000 prices ( c (ωjc2000 − ωjc1980 )Pc2000 ); and a part due
to the differential change in the cost of housing across cities, given the 1980 geographical
P
distribution ( c ωjc1980 (Pc2000 − Pc1980 )). The change in cost of housing of college graduates
relative to high school graduates is therefore the difference of these two components for
college graduates and high school graduates.
Empirically, I find that both factors are important. About 43% of the total increase
in cost of housing of college graduates relative to high school graduates is due to the first
component (geographical mobility of college graduates toward expensive cities), and 57% is
due to the second component (larger cost increase in cities that have many college graduates
in 1980).
Model 1 in the top panel of Table 3 estimates the conditional nominal wage difference
between workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more, by year. Estimates in columns 1 to 4 are from a regression of the log nominal hourly wage on an indicator
for college interacted with an indicator for year 1980, an indicator for college interacted
with an indicator for year 1990, an indicator for college interacted with an indicator for year
2000, years dummies, a cubic in potential experience, and dummies for gender and race.
Estimates in columns 5 to 8 are from models that also include MSA fixed effects. Entries
are the coefficients on the interactions of college and year and represent the conditional wage
difference for the relevant year. The sample includes all US born wage and salary workers
aged 25-60 who have worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year.5
My estimates in columns 1 to 4 indicate that the conditional nominal wage difference
between workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more has increased
significantly. The difference is 40% in 1980 and rises to 60% by 2000. Column 4 indicates
that this increase amounts to 20 percentage points. This estimate is generally consistent
with the previous literature (see, for example, Table 3 in Katz and Autor, 1999).
Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 show the conditional real wage differences between workers
with a high school degree and workers with college or more. To quantify this difference, I
estimate models that are similar to Model 1, where the dependent variable is the nominal
wage divided by Local CPI 1 (in Model 2) or by Local CPI 2 (in Model 3). Two features are
noteworthy. First, the level of the conditional college premium is lower in real terms than
5

The sample includes both men and women. This may be a concern, since in a recent paper by Black et
al. (2010) shows that female labor force participation is different in different cities. At the end of this subsection, I discuss a number of alternative specifications, including one when I estimate the college premium
for men and women separetely. Estimates by gender are similar to those obtained from the pooled sample.
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in nominal terms in each year. For example, in 2000 the conditional difference between the
wage for college graduates and high school graduates is .60 in nominal terms and only .53 in
real terms when Local CPI 1 is used as deflator. The difference is smaller—.51 percentage
points—when Local CPI 2 is used as deflator. Second, the increase between 1980 and 2000
in college premium is significantly smaller in real terms than in nominal terms. For example,
using Local CPI 1, the 1980-2000 increase in the conditional real wage difference between
college graduates and high school graduates is 15 percentage points. In other words, cost of
living differences as measured by Local CPI 1 account for 25% of the increase in conditional
inequality between college and high school graduates between 1980 and 2000 (column 4).
The effect of cost of living differences is even more pronounced when the cost of living is
measured by Local CPI 2. In this case, the increase in the conditional real wage difference
between college graduates and high school graduates is 14 percentage points. This implies
that cost of living differences as measured by Local CPI 2 account for 30% of the increase
in conditional wage inequality between college and high school graduates between 1980 and
2000 (column 4).
When I control for fixed effects for metropolitan areas in columns 5-8, the nominal college
premium is slightly smaller, but the real college premium is generally similar. The increase
in the college premium is 18 percentage points when measured in nominal terms, and 14-15
percentage points when measured in real terms, depending on whether CPI 1 or CPI 2 is used
as deflator. After conditioning on MSA fixed effects, cost of living differences account 22%
of the increase in conditional inequality between college and high school graduates between
1980 and 2000 when CPI 2 is used as a deflator (column 8).

5

A Simple Framework

The interpretation of differences in real income is not straightforward. If amenities differ
across cities, differences in real income do not necessarily equal differences in well-being. In
this Section, I use a simple general equilibrium model to investigate the implications of my
empirical findings for well-being disparities. The implications are different depending on the
reasons for the increase in the share of college graduates in expensive cities. I consider two
alternative explanations for such an increase.
1. First, it is possible that skilled workers move to expensive cities because the relative demand
of skilled labor increases in expensive cities, as firms located in these cities increasingly
seek to hire skilled labor. This can be due to localized skill-biased technical change
or positive shocks to the demand faced by industries that employ skilled workers and
are located in expensive cities (for example, high tech, finance, etc.). In this case, the
increase in utility disparity between skilled and unskilled workers is smaller than the
increase in nominal wage disparity, because the higher nominal wage of skilled workers
is in part off-sets by higher cost of living in the cities where skilled jobs are located.
11

2. Alternatively, it is possible that skilled workers move to expensive cities because the
relative supply of skilled labor increases in expensive cities, as skilled workers are increasingly attracted by amenities located in those cities. In this case, a higher cost
of housing reflects consumption of desirable local amenities. Since this consumption
arguably generates utility, it is possible to have large increases in utility disparities
even when increases in real wage disparities are limited.
To formalize these two alternative hypotheses, and what they imply for inequality in
utility and wages, I consider a simple general equilibrium model of the labor and housing
market. The model is a generalization of the Roback (1982, 1988) model and has two types
of workers, skilled workers (type H) and unskilled workers (type L). Like in Roback, workers
and firms are mobile and choose the location that maximizes utility or profits. But unlike
Roback, the elasticity of local labor supply is not infinite, so that productivity and amenity
shocks are not always fully capitalized into land prices. This allows shocks to the relative
demand and relative supply of skilled workers to have different effects on the utility of skilled
and unskilled workers.
For simplicity of exposition, I model the two explanations as mutually exclusive. In the
empirical tests that seek to distinguish between the two explanations (Section 6), I allow for
the possibility that both demand and supply forces are at play at the same time.

5.1

Assumptions and Equilibrium

I assume that each city is a competitive economy that produces a single output good y
which is traded on the international market, so that its price is the same everywhere and set
equal to 1. Like in Roback, I abstract from labor supply decisions and I assume that each
worker provides one unit of labor, so that local labor supply is only determined by workers’
location decisions. The indirect utility of skilled workers in city c is assumed to be
UHic = wHc − rc + AHc + eHic

(3)

where wHc is the nominal wage in the city; rc is the cost of housing; AHc is a measure
of local amenities. The random term eHic represents worker i idiosyncratic preferences for
location c. A larger eHic means that worker i is particularly attached to city c, holding
constant real wage and amenities. For example, being born in city c or having family in city
c may make city c more attractive to a worker. Similarly, the indirect utility of unskilled
workers is
ULic = wLc − rc + ALc + eLic

(4)

In equations 3 and 4, skilled and unskilled workers in a city compete for housing in the
same housing market and therefore face the same price of housing. This allows a shock to
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one group to be transmitted to the other group through its effect on housing prices.6 While
they have access to the same local amenities, different skill groups do not need to value these
amenities equally: AHc and ALc represent the skill-specific value of local amenities.
Assume that there are two cities—Mobile (city a) and San Francisco (city b)—and a fixed
number of workers is divided between the two cities. Tastes for location can vary by skill
group. Specifically, skilled workers’ and unskilled workers’ relative preferences for city a over
city b are, respectively
eHia − eHib ∼ U[−sH , sH ]

(5)

eLia − eLib ∼ U[−sL , sL ]

(6)

and
The parameters sH and sL characterize the importance of idiosyncratic preferences for
location and therefore the degree of labor mobility. If sH is large, for example, it means that
preferences for location are important for skilled workers and therefore their willingness to
move to arbitrage away real wage differences or amenity differences is limited. On the other
hand, if sH is small, preferences for location are not very important and therefore skilled
workers are more willing to move in response to differences in real wages or amenities. In
the extreme, if sH = 0 skilled workers’ mobility is perfect.
A worker chooses city a if and only if eia − eib > (wb − rb ) − (wa − ra ) + (Ab − Aa ). In
equilibrium, the marginal worker needs to be indifferent between living in Mobile and San
Francisco. This implies that skilled workers’ labor supply is upward sloping, with the slope
that depends on s. For example, the supply of skilled workers in San Francisco is:
NHb − NHa
)
(7)
N
where NHb is the log of the number of skilled workers hired in San Francisco and N =
NHa +NHb . If idiosyncratic preferences for location are not very important (sH is small), then
workers are very mobile and the supply curve is relatively flat. If idiosyncratic preferences for
location are very important (sH is large), then workers are rather immobile and the supply
curve is relatively steep. Moreover, an increase is the real wage in Mobile, or an improvement
in the relative amenities shifts back the labor supply curve in San Francisco.7
For simplicity, I focus on the case where skilled and unskilled workers in the same city
work in different firms. This amounts to assuming away imperfect substitution between
skilled and unskilled workers. This assumption simplifies the analysis, and it is not crucial
wHb = wHa + (rb − ra ) + (Aa − Ab ) + sH (

6

It is easy to relax this assumption by assuming some residential segregation by skill level within a city.
An important difference between the Rosen-Roback setting and this setting is that in Rosen-Roback, all
workers are identical, and always indifferent across locations. In this setting, workers differ in their preferences
for location. While the marginal worker is indifferent between locations, here there are inframarginal workers
who enjoy economic rents. These rents are larger the smaller the elasticity of local labor supply.
7
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(Moretti, 2010). The production function for firms in city c that use skilled labor is CobbDouglas with constant returns to scale: ln yHc = XHc + hNHc + (1 − h)KHc , where KHc is
the log of capital and XHc is a skill and city-specific productivity shifter. Firms are assumed
to be perfectly mobile. If firms are price takers and labor is paid its marginal product, labor
demand for skilled labor in city c is
wHc = XHc − (1 − h)NHc + (1 − h)KHc + ln h

(8)

The labor market for unskilled workers is similar. I assume that there is an international
capital market, and that capital is infinitely supplied at a given price i.8
Each worker consumes one unit of housing, so that demand for housing is determined by
the number of skilled and unskilled workers in a city. Specifically, the the local demand for
housing is the sum the demand of skilled workers and the demand of unskilled workers. For
example, in city b:

rb =

(2sH sL )(NHb + NLb ) sL (wHa − wHb − ra ) sH (wLa − wLb − ra )
(2sH sL )
−
−
−
(9)
(sH + sL )
N(sH + sL )
(sL + sH )
(sL + sH )

To close the model, I assume that the supply of housing is
rc = z + kc Nc

(10)

where Nc = NHc + NLc is the number of housing units in city c, which is the same as the
number of workers. The parameter kc characterizes the elasticity of the supply of housing.
I assume that this parameter is exogenously determined by geography and local land regulations. In cities where geography and regulations make it is easy to build new housing,
kc is small. In the extreme case where there are no constraints to building new houses, the
supply curve is horizontal, and kc is zero. In cities where geography and regulations make
it difficult to build new housing, kc is large. In the extreme case where it is impossible to
build new houses, the supply curve is vertical, and kc is infinite.9
In period 1, the two cities are assumed to be identical. Equilibrium in the labor market
is obtained by equating equations 7 and 8 for each city. Equilibrium in the housing market
is obtained by equating equations 9 and 10. I consider two scenarios for period 2. In the first
scenario, the relative demand of skilled workers increases in one of the two cities (Section
8

In equilibrium demand for capital is equal to its supply and marginal product of capital is the same for
firms that use skill labor and those that use unskilled labor: XHc − hKHc + hNHc + ln(1 − h)= ln iXLc −
hKLc + hNLc + ln(1 − h) = ln i.
9
A limitation of equation 10 is housing production does not involve the use of any local input. Roback
(1982) and Glaeser (2008), among others, discuss spatial equilibrium in the case where housing production
involves the use of local labor and other local inputs. Moreover, equation 10 ignores the durability of housing.
Glaeser and Gyourko (2001) point out that once built, the housing stock does not depreciate quickly and
this introduces an asymmetry between positive and negative demand shocks. In particular, when demand
declines, the quantity of housing cannot decline, at least in the short run.
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5.2). In the second scenario, the relative supply of skilled workers increases in one of the
two cities (Section 5.3). The implications of the two scenarios for the empirical analysis are
summarized in Section 5.4.

5.2

Increase in the Relative Demand of Skilled Labor

Here I consider the case where the productivity of skilled workers increases relative to
the productivity of unskilled workers in San Francisco. Nothing happens to the productivity
of unskilled workers in San Francisco and the productivity of skilled and unskilled workers
in Mobile. In other words, the relative demand for skilled labor increases in San Francisco.
The amenities in the two cities are identical and fixed. Formally, I assume that in period
2, the productivity shifter for skilled workers in San Francisco is higher than in period 1:
XHb2 = XHb1 + ∆, where ∆ > 0 represents a positive, localized, skill-biased productivity
shock. I have added subscripts 1 and 2 to denote periods 1 and 2. The dot-com boom
experienced by the San Francisco Bay Area is arguably an example of such a localized skill
biased shock. Driven by the advent of the Internet and the agglomeration of high tech firms
in the area, the demand for skilled workers increased significantly (relative to the demand
for unskilled workers) in San Francisco in the second half of the 1990s.10
Because skilled workers in San Francisco have become more productive, their nominal
wage increases by an amount ∆/h, proportional to the productivity increase. Attracted
by this higher productivity, some skilled workers leave Mobile and move to San Francisco.
Following this inflow of skilled workers, the cost of housing in San Francisco increases by
rb2 − rb1 =

sL Nkb ∆
≥0
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )

(11)

In Mobile, the cost of housing declines by the same amount because of out-migration. In
San Francisco, real wages of skilled workers increase by

(wHb2 − rb2 ) − (wHb1 − rb1 ) =

ka NsH + kb NsH + ka NsL + 2sH sL
∆ ≥ 0 (12)
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )

It is easy to see that, because of the increased cost of housing, the increase in real wages
is smaller than the increase in nominal wages ∆/h. Moreover, this increase in the real wage
of skilled workers is larger the more elastic is housing supply in San Francisco (small kb ).
Intuitively, a more elastic housing supply implies a smaller increase in housing prices in San
Francisco, and therefore a larger increase in real wage, for a given increase in nominal wage.
The increase in the real wage of skilled workers is also larger the smaller the elasticity of
10

Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008) argue that over the past 30 years, technological change resulted in
increases in the productivity of skilled workers in cities that already had many skilled workers. These cities
also happen to be cities with a higher than average initial share of college graduates and cost of housing.
See also Berry and Glaeser (2005).
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local labor supply of skilled workers (large sH ). Intuitively, lower elasticity of labor supply
implies less mobility. With less mobility, a larger fraction of the benefit of the productivity
shocks is capitalized in real wages. In the extreme case of no mobility, (sH = ∞), the entire
productivity shock is capitalized in the real wage of skilled workers. The increase in the
real wage of skilled workers is larger the larger the elasticity of local labor supply of skilled
workers (small sL ). A higher elasticity of labor supply of unskilled workers implies that a
larger number of unskilled workers move out in response to the inflow of skilled workers, so
that the increase in housing costs is more limited.
In Mobile nominal wages don’t change and housing costs decline, so that real wages for
skilled workers increase by
sL k a N
∆ ≥ 0 (13)
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )

(wHa2 − ra2 ) − (wHa1 − ra1 ) =

Although the shock has increased productivity only in one city, the equilibrium real
wages of skilled workers increase in both cities because of mobility. By comparing equation
12 with 13, it is easy to see that the increase in real wages in the city directly affected by the
productivity shock (San Francisco) is larger than the increase in real wages in the city not
affected by the productivity shock (Mobile): (wHb2 − rb2 ) − (wHb1 − rb1 ) ≥ (wHa2 − ra2 ) −
(wHa1 − ra1 ). This is not surprising. While labor mobility causes real wages to increase
in Mobile following a shock in San Francisco, real wages are not fully equalized because
mobility is not perfect and only the marginal worker is indifferent between the two cities in
equilibrium. With perfect mobility (sH = 0), real wages are completely equalized.
What happens to the wage of unskilled workers? Because their productivity is fixed,
their nominal wage does not change. However, housing costs increase in San Francisco and
decline in Mobile. As a consequence, the real wage of unskilled workers in San Francisco
decreases by

(wLb2 − rb2 ) − (wLb1 − rb1 ) = −

sL Nkb
∆ ≤ 0 (14)
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )

Effectively, unskilled workers compete for scarce housing with skilled workers, and the
inflow of new skilled workers in San Francisco hurts inframarginal unskilled workers through
higher housing costs. Marginal unskilled workers leave San Francisco, since their real wage
is higher in Mobile. Inframarginal unskilled workers (those who have a strong preference for
San Francisco over Mobile) opt to stay in San Francisco, even if their real wage is lower.
For the same reason, the real wage and utility of inframarginal unskilled workers in Mobile
increases:

(wLa2 − ra2 ) − (wLa1 − ra1 ) =

sL Nka
∆ ≥ 0 (15)
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )
16

The equilibrium number of skilled workers increases in San Francisco, while the equilibrium number of unskilled workers decreases. Changes in employment in Mobile are exactly
specular, by assumption. On net, the overall population of San Francisco increases because
the number of skilled workers who move in is larger than the number of unskilled workers
who leave.11
The productivity shock creates winners and losers. Skilled workers in both cities and
landowners in San Francisco benefit from the productivity increase. Inframarginal unskilled
workers in San Francisco are negatively affected, and inframarginal unskilled workers in
Mobile are positively affected.12 The exact magnitude of the changes in utility for skilled and
unskilled workers and for landowners crucially depends on which of the three factors—skilled
labor, unskilled labor or land—is supplied more elastically at the local level. Specifically, the
incidence of the shock depends on the elasticities of labor supply of the two groups (which
are governed by the preference parameters sH and sL ) and the elasticities of housing supply
in the two cities (which are governed by the parameters ka and kb ). Moretti (forthcoming)
provides detailed discussion of the incidence and welfare consequences of relative demand
shocks.
The model also illustrates that a non-degenerate equilibrium is possible. After a shock
that makes one group more productive, both groups are still represented in both cities. This
conclusion hinges upon the assumption of a less than infinite elasticity of local labor supply.13
Firms are indifferent between cities because they make the same profits in both cities. While
labor is now more expensive in San Francisco, it is also more productive there. Because firms
produce a good that is internationally traded, if skilled workers weren’t more productive,
employers would leave San Francisco and relocate to Mobile.14
11

In particular, the number of skilled workers in San Francisco increases by
NHb2 − NHb1 =

∆N ((ka + kb )N + 2sL )
≥0
2h(ka N (sH + sL ) + kb N (sH + sL ) + 2sH sL )

(16)

The number of unskilled workers declines by
NLb2 − NLb1 = −

N 2 (ka + kb )
∆≤0
2h(ka N sH + 2sH sL + ka N sL + kb N sH + kb N sL )

(17)

San Francisco population increases by
(NHb2 + NLb2 ) − (NHb1 + NLb1 ) =

∆N sL
≥0
h(ka N (sH + sL ) + kb N (sH + sL ) + 2sH sL )

12

(18)

Although inframarginal unskilled workers in San Francisco are made worse off by the decline in their real
wage, they are still better off in San Francisco than in Mobile because of their preference for San Francisco.
13
In the absence of individual preferences for location, no unskilled worker would remain in San Francisco
and the equilibrium would be characterized by complete geographic segregation of workers by skill level.
This is not realistic, since in reality we never observe cities that are populated by workers of only one type.
14
An assumption of this model is that skilled and unskilled workers are employed by different firms, so
that the labor market is segregated by skill within a city. This assumption effectively rules out imperfect
substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor. In a more general setting, skilled and unskilled workers

17

5.3

Increase in the Relative Supply of Skilled Labor

In the case of demand pull described above, the number of skilled workers in San Francisco
increases because the relative demand of skilled workers increases. I now turn to the opposite
case, where the number of skilled workers in San Francisco increases because the relative
supply of skilled workers in San Francisco increases.
Specifically, I consider what happens when San Francisco becomes relatively more desirable for skilled workers compared to Mobile. I assume that in period 2, the amenity level
increases for skilled workers in San Francisco: AHb2 = AHb1 + ∆′ , where ∆′ > 0 represents
the improvement in the amenity. I assume that the productivity of both skilled and unskilled
workers, as well as the amenity level in Mobile, do not change.15
Unlike the case of demand, here the nominal wage of skilled workers in San Francisco and
Mobile remains unchanged.16 Attracted by the better amenity, some skilled workers move
from Mobile to San Francisco and some unskilled workers leave San Francisco to Mobile.17
On net, the population in San Francisco increases by

(NHb2 + NLb2 ) − (NHb1 + NLb1 ) =

∆′ NsL
≥0
h(ka N(sH + sL ) + kb N(sH + sL ) + 2sH sL )

(19)

As a consequence, housing costs in San Francisco increase by
rb2 − rb1 =

sL Nkb ∆′
≥0
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )

(20)

work in the same firm. The qualitative results generalize, but the equilibrium depends on the degree of
imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. Specifically, complementarity between skilled
and unskilled workers implies that the marginal product of unskilled workers increases in the number of
skilled workers in the same firm. Thus, the inflow of skilled workers in city b caused by the increase in their
productivity endogenously raises the productivity of unskilled workers in city b. As a consequence, the real
wage of unskilled workers declines less than in the case described above. This mitigates the negative effect
on the welfare of unskilled workers in city b and it reduces the number of unskilled workers who leave the
city.
15
For simplicity, I have assumed that supply shocks are driven by increases in amenities for given tastes.
Glaeser and Tobio (2007) have a model that makes a similar assumption. Alternatively I could assume that
(i) amenities are fixed, but the taste for those amenities increase; or (ii) both amenities and tastes are fixed,
but amenities are a normal good so that college graduates consume more of them than high school graduates
(Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai, 2006).
16
This may be surprising at first. While one might expect wage increases in response to demand increases
(indeed, this is what happens in subsection 5.2), one might expect wage decreases in response to supply
increases. Why nominal wages do not decline in San Francisco? The reason is that in a model with capital,
nominal wages do not move in San Francisco because capital flows to San Francisco and leaves Mobile,
offsetting the changes in labor supply in the two cities. (In a model without capital nominal wages do
decline.)
17
Specifically, the number of skilled workers who move to San Francisco is equal to
∆′ N ((ka +kb )N +2sL )
The number of unskilled workers who move to Mobile is
2h(ka N (sH +sL )+kb N (sH +sL )+2sH sL ) ≥ 0.
equal to

∆′ N 2 (ka +kb )
2h(ka N (sH +sL )+kb N (sH +sL )+2sH sL )

≥ 0.
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and decline in Mobile by
ra2 − ra1 = −

sL Nka ∆′
≤0
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )

(21)

Real wages of skilled workers in San Francisco decline by an amount equal to equation
20 (with a minus sign in front). This reflects the compensating differential for the better
amenity in San Francisco. Real wages of skilled workers in Mobile increase by an amount
equal to equation 21 (with a minus sign in front).
Similarly, the real wage for unskilled workers in San Francisco declines by

(wLb2 − rb2 ) − (wLb1 − rb1 ) = −

sL Nkb
∆′ ≤ 0 (22)
h(ka NsH + 2sH sL + ka NsL + kb NsH + kb NsL )

and it increases in Mobile.
Like for the case of demand shocks, a supply shock generates winners and losers. Here
inframarginal skilled workers benefit from the improvement in amenities. While the utility
gain is larger for inframarginal skilled workers in San Francisco, inframarginal skilled workers
in Mobile are also made better off, even if there is no change in amenity there. On the other
hand, inframarginal unskilled workers in San Francisco are made worse off by the increase
in housing prices. Similarly, inframarginal unskilled workers in Mobile are made better off
by the decline in local housing prices.

5.4

Implications for Inequality in Wages and Utility

The model has three implications that are useful in guiding the interpretation of the
empirical findings.
(A) First, the model clarifies the relationship between changes in relative wages and
changes in relative utility in the two scenarios. The analysis in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 suggests
that for a given nation-wide increase in the nominal wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers, the demand pull hypothesis implies a more limited increase in utility inequality,
while the supply push hypothesis implies a larger increase in utility inequality.
More specifically, in the demand pull scenario the nominal wage difference between skilled
and unskilled workers averaged across the two cities increases.18 The utility difference between skilled and unskilled workers averaged across the two cities also increases, but by an
amount smaller than the increase in the nominal wage gap. It is possible to show that the
larger is the increase in housing costs experienced by skilled workers relative to unskilled
workers, the smaller is the increase in average utility experienced by skilled workers relative
to unskilled workers.19
18

This average is a weighted average reflecting the size of the two cities.
To formally see this, consider the population-weighted average across the two cities of the change in the
skilled-unskilled nominal wage difference and compare it with the population-weighted average across the
19

19

The intuition is simple. The benefits of a higher nominal wage for skilled workers are
in part eroded by the higher cost of housing in the cities where the new skilled jobs are
created. Thus, the relative utility of skilled workers does not increase as much as their
relative nominal wage. Put differently, if college graduates move to expensive cities like San
Francisco and New York because of increases in the relative demand for college graduates in
these cities—and not because they particularly like living in San Francisco and New York—
then part of the benefit of higher nominal wage is offset by the higher cost of living. In this
case, the increase in their real wage and utility level is smaller than the increase in their
nominal wage.
By contrast, in the supply push scenario, the utility difference between skilled and unskilled workers averaged across the two cities increases more than the nominal and real wage
difference between skilled and unskilled workers averaged across the two cities. Intuitively,
if college graduates move to expensive cities like San Francisco and New York because improvements in amenities raise the relative supply of college graduates there—and not because
of labor demand—then there may still be a significant increase in utility inequality even if
the increase in real wage inequality is limited. In this case, increases in the cost of living in
these cities simply reflect the increased attractiveness of these cities to skilled workers and
represent the price to pay for the consumption of desirable amenities.20
(B) Second, the equilibrium described in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 suggests a simple empirical test to distinguish between the two cases. If relative demand shifts are responsible for
the geographical reallocation of labor, we should see that in equilibrium, cities that experience large increases in the relative number of skilled workers (in the model: San Francisco)
two cities of the change in the skilled-unskilled utility difference. In the simple case where ka = kb = k, the
difference between the two is
N k∆2 sL (sL + 2kN )
≥0
2
H + sH sL + kN sL )

2h2 (kN s

(23)

which is non-negative, indicating that the relative nominal wage of skilled workers grows more than their
relative utility. In the more general case where ka 6= kb , the difference between the two remains positive as
long as the elasticity of housing supply in the city affected by the demand shock is not too large compared
with the elasticity of housing supply in the city not directly affected by the demand shock.
20
To formally see this, note that the simple case where ka = kb = k, the population-weighted average
change in the skilled-unskilled nominal wage difference minus the population-weighted change in the skilledunskilled utility difference is equal to
−∆′ (−kN sL ∆′ + 2kN sH sL + 2kN sH sL + sH sL + sL ∆′ sH + k 2 N 2 s2L + k 2 N 2 s2H + k 2 N 2 sH ∆′ + 2kN s2H sL + 2N k∆′ sH sL
(2(kN sH + sH sL + kN sL )2 )
(24)
which is non-positive unless the elasticity of local labor supply of skilled workers is too small compared
with the elasticity of local labor supply of unskilled workers. In the more general case where ka 6= kb , the
expression is considerably more complicated, but the difference remains non-positive unless the elasticity of
local labor supply of skilled workers is too small.
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also experience increases in the relative nominal wage of skilled workers, compared to cities
that experience small increases (or declines) in the relative number of skilled workers (in the
model: Mobile). By contrast, if relative supply shifts are responsible for the geographical
reallocation of labor, we should see that in equilibrium, cities that experience an increase in
the relative number of skilled workers experience no change in the relative nominal wage of
skilled workers.
One might have expected that an increase in the relative supply of factor of production in
a city should cause a decline in its equilibrium relative price. Why in the model the nominal
wage of skilled workers in San Francisco remains constant following an increase in the relative
supply of skilled workers? As discussed in Section 5.3, this is due to the endogenous reaction
of capital. Because capital is supplied with infinite elasticity at a fixed interest rate, nominal
wages do not move in San Francisco because capital flows to San Francisco and leaves Mobile,
thus offsetting the effect of changes in labor supply in the two cities. In a model without
capital, nominal wages of skilled workers decline in San Francisco following an increase in
their supply.
(C) Finally, it is important to point out that, while the focus of the paper is on inequality
related to labor market outcomes, the broader welfare consequences of the demand and
supply shocks depend not just on changes in relative wages, but also on which of the two
education groups originally owns the land in the cities that benefit from the demand and
supply shocks. In the model, some landowners benefit from the demand and supply shocks
(namely those in San Francisco), while other are hurt (namely those in Mobile). The relevant
empirical question in this respect is which of the two skill groups owns more of the land in
the neighborhoods that whose land prices are raised by the inflow of new residents in cities
that experience positive skill-biased shocks and the neighborhoods that are abandoned by
the outflow of residents is cities that experience negative shocks. This is an important but
complicated question. A full empirical treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for future research.

6

Interpreting the Evidence: Demand Pull or Supply
Push?

I now present empirical evidence that seeks to determine whether relative demand or relative supply shifts—or a combination of the two—drive changes in the geographical location
of different skill groups. The analysis in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 suggests that the demand
pull and the supply push hypotheses have similar predictions for equilibrium housing costs:
under both hypotheses, cities that experience large increases in the share of college graduates
should also experience large increases in housing costs.
But the demand pull and supply push hypotheses have different predictions for wage
21

changes. Under the demand pull hypothesis, cities that experience large increases in the
share of college graduates should experience large increases in the equilibrium relative wage
of college graduates. By contrast, under the supply push hypothesis, there should be no
positive relationship between increases in the share of college graduates and changes in the
equilibrium relative nominal wages. (See Section 5.4, part B.) Intuitively, increases in the
relative demand of a factor of production in a city should result in increases in its equilibrium
relative price there. Increases in the relative supply of factor of production in a city can not
cause an increase in its equilibrium relative price. A similar idea is used in Katz and Murphy
(1992) to explain nationwide changes in relative wages.21
It is important to highlight that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive since it
is possible that cities experience both demand and supply shocks. It is also possible that
relative demand shifts endogenously generate relative supply shifts, and vice versa. For
example, an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor in a city may result in an
increase in the number of college educated residents in that city and this in turns may result
in increases in the local amenities that are attractive to college graduates, such as good
schools, good theaters, good restaurants, etc. Alternatively, an increase in the supply of
skilled workers in a city may generate agglomeration spillovers that lead to increases in the
productivity of firms and workers in that city (Moretti 2004a, 2004b).
I present two pieces of empirical evidence. First, I look at the OLS relationship between
changes in the college share and changes in the college premium across US metropolitan areas.
The finding of a positive coefficient indicates that relative demand shifts are important, but
does not rule out the existence of relative supply shifts. Second, to shed more light on
whether relative supply shifts are important, I use an instrumental variable strategy.
(1) First, in Figure 2, I show the empirical relationship between the equilibrium college
share and the equilibrium college premium across US metropolitan areas, both in the 2000
cross-section and in changes between 1980 and 2000. Demand pull would predict a positive
slope, while supply push would predict zero slope. Note that that the relationship in the
Figure is not causal. Rather, it is an equilibrium relationship between relative number of
college graduates and their relative wage. This is in contrast with earlier work, including
my own, that seeks to establish the causal effect of increases in college share on wages and
therefore estimate different specifications.22
21

In the literature, there are several existing measures of quality-of-life differences across metropolitan
areas (see, for example, Chen and Rosenthal, 2008; and Albouy, 2009). One may be tempted to use these
measures to provide an additional empirical test of my conclusions by estimating the relationship between
these existing measures of local amenities and the share of college graduates across cities. However, this type
of test would be difficult to implement in practice. As explained above, what matters in my framework is
the (change over time in) the difference in amenities that attract skilled and unskilled workers. By contrast,
the existing measures of local amenities are typically city-wide, and do not differentiate between skilled and
unskilled workers.
22
For example, in Moretti (2004), I try to establish the causal effect of increases in college share on wages.
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The Figure shows a positive association between the college share and the college premium across US metropolitan areas, both in levels as well as in changes. Columns 1 and 2
in Table 4 quantify the corresponding regression coefficients. The level of observation is the
metropolitan area. The dependent variable is the city-specific college premium, defined as
the city-specific difference in the log of hourly wage for college graduates and high school
graduates conditional on all the controls used in the regressions (a cubic in potential experience, year effects, gender and race). Models are weighted by city size. The coefficient for
the specification in column 2 is positive and statistically significant: .388 (.057).
This evidence is consistent with demand factors playing a significant role in driving
variation in college share across cities. This conclusion is consistent with Berry and Glaeser
(2005), who argue that demand factors play a more important role than supply factors in
explaining the sorting of skilled workers across US metropolitan areas.
(2) The evidence in Figure 2 and Table 4 suggests that demand factors are important,
but does not rule out that supply factors are also present. As a second piece of evidence that
may shed more light on whether relative supply factors play any role in driving variation in
college share across cities, I use observable shocks to the relative demand of skilled labor as
an instrumental variable for college share.
This IV estimate isolates the effect on the college premium of changes in the college share
that are driven exclusively by changes in relative demand. Put differently, the instrumental
variable estimate establishes what happens to the college premium in a city when the city
experiences an increase in the number of college graduates that is driven purely by an increase
in the relative demand for college graduates. By contrast, the OLS estimate above establishes
what happens to the college premium in a city when the city experiences an increase in the
number of college graduates that may be driven by either demand or supply shocks. The
comparison of the two estimates is therefore informative about the relative importance of
demand and supply shocks.
To isolate relative demand shocks, I use as an instrument the weighted average of nationwide relative employment growth by industry, with weights reflecting the city-specific
employment share in those industries:
Change in Relative Demand in City c =

X

ηsc (∆EHs − ∆ELs )

(25)

s

where ηsc is the share of jobs in industry s in city c in 1980; ∆EHs is the nationwide change
The econometric specification adopted here differs from the specification there, because in Moretti (2004)
the econometric model seeks to control for shocks to the relative demand of skilled labor. To this end, I
include in the regressions as controls several variables in order to absorb changes in the relative demand
for college graduates. I also use instrumental variables to further control for relative demand shocks. By
contrast, in this paper, I engage in a completely different exercise. I do not seek to hold constant demand
shocks. Instead, I am interested in establishing the role played by demand shocks in affecting changes in
college share across cities. What I am measuring in Figure 2 and Table 4 is the relationship between the
wage gap and the college share, inclusive of any human capital spillover.

23

between 1980 and 2000 in the log of number of jobs for college graduates in industry s
(excluding city c); ∆ELs is a similar change for high school graduates. If relative employment
of skilled workers in a given industry increases (decreases) nationally, cities where that
industry employs a significant share of the labor force will experience a positive (negative)
relative shock to the labor demand of skilled workers (Katz and Murphy, 1992).
The first stage relationship between demand shocks and changes in college share is shown
graphically in Figure 3. The figure shows that in cities that experience an increase in
the relative demand of college graduates the share of college graduates increases and the
relationship appears fairly tight. The regression coefficient is .42(.02), with R2 of .44. This
is interesting because it means that this measure of demand shocks alone accounts for almost
half of the variation in the geographical location of different skill groups. Since there are
other demand shocks that are not captured by the instrument, this lends indirect support
to the notion that demand shocks play an important role.
The instrumental variable estimate, in column 3 of Table 4, is .371 (.106) and is remarkably close to the OLS estimate. The similarity between the OLS and the IV estimates
suggests that the increase in the college premium in a city caused by a demand shock (IV
estimate in column 3) is not very different from the empirical correlation between the college
share and the college premium that is observed in the data (OLS estimate in column 2).
In other words, most of the empirical correlation between the college share and the college
premium that is observed in the data seems to be driven by demand shocks.

7

Conclusions

Because of their different geographical distribution, US households are exposed to different levels and trends in cost of living. One contribution of this paper is to document
that, as a consequence, the conditional difference between the wage of skilled workers and of
unskilled workers is significantly lower in real terms than in nominal terms and has grown
less. In 2000, the level of the college premium is 60% in nominal terms and only 51% in real
terms. More importantly, the increase in the college premium between 1980 and 2000 in real
terms is significantly smaller than the increase in nominal terms. Specifically, at least 22%
of the documented increase in the college premium between 1980 and 2000 is accounted for
by differences in the cost of living.
The implications of this empirical finding for disparities in well-being depend on the reasons for the increase in the share of college graduates in expensive cities. Using a simple
general equilibrium model of the labor and housing markets, I consider two broad classes
of explanations. Under a demand pull hypothesis, the relative demand of college graduates
increases in expensive cities because of localized skill-biased technical change or other demand shocks. In this case, college graduates move to expensive cities because the jobs for
college graduates are increasingly located in those cities, and not because they particularly

24

like living in those cities. The increase in their utility level is smaller than the increase
in their nominal wage due to higher cost of living. Under a supply push hypothesis, the
relative supply of college graduates increases in expensive cities because college graduates
are increasingly attracted by amenities located in those cities. The increase in the cost of
living in those cities reflects the attractiveness of the cities to skilled workers and is the price
for the consumption of desirable amenities. In this case, there may still be a significant
increase in utility inequality even if the increase in real wage inequality is limited. Of course,
the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that cities experience both
demand and supply shocks.
To determine whether the variation in the relative number of college graduates across
cities is driven by relative demand or relative supply shocks, I analyze the equilibrium relationship between changes in college premium and changes in the share of college graduates
across metropolitan areas. Consistent with demand shocks playing an important role, I
find a positive association between changes in college premium and changes in college share:
cities that experience large increases in the fraction of college graduates also experience large
increases in the relative wage of college graduates. I also present an instrumental variable
estimate obtained by instrumenting changes in college share with a measure of arguably
exogenous relative demand shocks.
The weight of the evidence seems consistent with the notion that changes in the geographical location of different skill groups are mostly driven by changes in their relative
demand. I conclude that the increase in well-being disparities between 1980 and 2000 is
significantly smaller than we previously thought based on the existing literature.
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Table 1
Metropolitan Area

San Jose, CA
Stamford, CT
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA
Santa Cruz, CA
Danbury, CT
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA
Boston, MA-NH
Honolulu, HI
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA
Salinas-Sea Side-Monterey, CA
New York-Northeastern NJ
Washington, DC/MD/VA
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ
San Diego, CA
Seattle-Everett, WA
Nashua, NH
Trenton, NJ
Bridgeport, CT
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood-Pompano Beach, FL
Austin, TX
Naples, FL
Anchorage, AK
Newburgh-Middletown, NY
Atlanta, GA
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Delray Beach, FL
San Luis Obispo-Atascad-P Robles, CA
Denver-Boulder, CO
Ann Arbor, MI
Miami-Hialeah, FL
Chicago, IL
New Haven-Meriden, CT
Santa Fe, NM
Las Vegas, NV
Dutchess Co., NY
Reno, NV
Orlando, FL
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO
Philadelphia, PA/NJ
Portland, OR-WA
Brockton, MA
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
Sarasota, FL
Atlantic City, NJ

Nominal
Income
54405.32
79374.09
48579.09
42374.27
58414.7
38030.82
40325.79
46411.32
33805.31
40565.8
32324.44
42989.14
48057.21
35780.87
44945.88
37271.78
43504.58
41359.91
47288.35
47589.96
36237.65
41269.63
38590.7
40751.3
38105.78
39956.47
38719.36
39084.94
36011.36
40966.75
45702.14
29531.75
41064.57
39954.43
36554.24
32834.18
39612.11
36923.75
33899.67
38589.2
39752.9
37142.06
35189.11
42254
34270.81
33758.89

Real
Income
39187.88
60490.73
38189.25
34700.63
48454.08
32626.27
34930.42
40253.07
29322.25
35323.53
28257.47
37646.13
42142.48
31614.55
40199.32
33352.23
39010.95
37343.74
42817.15
43161.88
32922.89
37975.6
35576.77
37590.96
35186.28
36913.66
35817.87
36189.78
33478.59
38117.18
42652.77
27644.46
38514.93
37641.28
34458.73
30964.15
37361.38
34849.31
32215.98
36674.33
37826.65
35433.87
33642.55
40526.07
32876.42
32426.39

Percent
Difference
-0.279705
-0.237903
-0.213875
-0.181092
-0.170516
-0.14211
-0.133795
-0.132689
-0.132614
-0.129229
-0.125817
-0.124288
-0.123077
-0.11644
-0.105606
-0.105161
-0.103291
-0.097103
-0.094552
-0.093046
-0.091473
-0.079817
-0.0781
-0.077552
-0.076616
-0.076153
-0.074937
-0.074074
-0.070333
-0.069558
-0.066723
-0.063907
-0.062088
-0.057895
-0.057326
-0.056954
-0.056819
-0.056182
-0.049667
-0.049622
-0.048456
-0.045991
-0.04395
-0.040894
-0.040687
-0.039471

Manchester, NH
Wilmington, DE/NJ/MD
Raleigh-Durham, NC
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX
Sacramento, CA
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton- New Britain, CT
Phoenix, AZ
Madison, WI
Colorado Springs, CO
Baltimore, MD
Yolo, CA
Riverside-San Bernadino, CA
Bremerton, WA
Portland, ME
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL
Bellingham, WA
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Olympia, WA
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT
Tacoma, WA
Fort Pierce, FL
Detroit, MI
Kenosha, WI
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
Worcester, MA
Vineland-Milville-Bridgetown, NJ
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC
Jacksonville, FL
Stockton, CA
Houston-Brazoria, TX
Richmond-Petersburg, VA
Savannah, GA
Nashville, TN
Charlottesville, VA
Rochester, NY
Galveston-Texas City, TX
Charleston-N.Charleston,SC
Modesto, CA
Norfolk-VA Beach--Newport News, VA
Waterbury, CT
Milwaukee, WI
Daytona Beach, FL
Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa-Palm Bay, FL
Columbus, OH
Provo-Orem, UT
Punta Gorda, FL
Des Moines, IA
Iowa City, IA
Eugene-Springfield, OR
Wilmington, NC
Rochester, MN

32247.5
41096.62
39050.45
38891.01
36571.38
42644.75
35694.89
40291.4
35250.73
39244.79
34478.04
30286.15
35006.92
38112.26
32143.15
31298.4
33340.45
34837.69
34928.59
34070.5
32310.43
39068.79
34721.79
35908.91
35944.34
28310.53
36711.14
33719.22
30235.71
36133.14
37188.42
33286.53
35934.79
36498.48
34722.74
35582.36
32779.3
29215.99
32256.25
27905.45
38241.19
28399.17
31699.74
37124.03
32740.22
29018.52
37387.23
40470.77
29887.08
31289.38
39944.34

31020.46
39570.11
37648.44
37567.47
35380.04
41292.27
34648.93
39190.29
34354.23
38340.1
33687.54
29643.71
34267.89
37377.45
31544.09
30852.01
32867.79
34405.98
34562.71
33771.25
32037.19
38747.12
34483.32
35691.44
35751.28
28169.08
36581.58
33675.38
30226.49
36124.92
37242.79
33375.5
36039.38
36637.57
34873.8
35737.96
32924.33
29385.18
32504.74
28152.26
38599.76
28687.39
32026.86
37563
33157.5
29425.38
37915.51
41111.8
30362.39
31789.55
40612.47

-0.038051
-0.037144
-0.035902
-0.034032
-0.032576
-0.031715
-0.029303
-0.027329
-0.025432
-0.023052
-0.022928
-0.021212
-0.021111
-0.01928
-0.018637
-0.014262
-0.014177
-0.012392
-0.010475
-0.008783
-0.008457
-0.008234
-0.006868
-0.006056
-0.005371
-0.004997
-0.003529
-0.0013
-0.000305
-0.000228
0.001462
0.002673
0.002911
0.003811
0.00435
0.004373
0.004425
0.005791
0.007704
0.008845
0.009377
0.010149
0.010319
0.011825
0.012745
0.014021
0.01413
0.015839
0.015903
0.015985
0.016727

Kansas City, MO-KS
Indianapolis, IN
Salem, OR
Fort Walton Beach, FL
Bloomington, IN
Albuquerque, NM
Racine, WI
Akron, OH
Medford, OR
Hamilton-Middleton, OH
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA
Boise City, ID
Lancaster, PA
Grand Junction, CO
Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee, MA
Tallahassee, FL
Flagstaff, AZ-UT
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ
Chico, CA
Bryan-College Station, TX
Memphis, TN/AR/MS
Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, MA/RI
Greeley, CO
Lafayette-W. Lafayette, IN
Myrtle Beach, SC
Janesville-Beloit, WI
Tucson, AZ
Panama City, FL
Cleveland, OH
Grand Rapids, MI
Lexington-Fayette, KY
Reading, PA
Harrisburg-Lebanon--Carlisle, PA
Gainesville, FL
Omaha, NE/IA
Columbia, SC
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA
San Antonio, TX
Rockford, IL
Bloomington-Normal, IL
Corpus Christi, TX
Lansing-E. Lansing, MI
Lincoln, NE
Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL
Green Bay, WI
Dover, DE
Redding, CA
St. Louis, MO-IL
Syracuse, NY
Glens Falls, NY
Kankakee, IL

36585.43
36740.44
30279.69
30826.94
35287.22
31368.05
37175.47
34589.23
29551.2
36560.79
32646.05
32759.97
32411.22
29795.67
32634.31
34320.47
28418.07
33345.67
29226.81
35135.84
35329.28
32869.16
31834.76
33098.84
28886.44
33542.3
29832.98
28760.07
35535.54
34467.61
37080.36
32627.74
32895.91
33813.2
36312.59
33362.96
32015.18
30728.81
33912.7
37261.69
30003.89
35652.79
35533.91
34266.46
35894.98
29339.38
29306.26
35693.13
32085.34
28794.21
30986.48

37217.44
37417.32
30878.07
31459.54
36057.2
32077.96
38017.38
35381.11
30228.2
37405.85
33401.82
33570.17
33222.16
30544.78
33461.07
35221.08
29186.23
34297.5
30095.82
36205.46
36406.64
33881.61
32825.89
34171.1
29837.68
34666.22
30836.94
29741.86
36750.79
35661.8
38399.98
33793.17
34091.15
35043.57
37660.39
34614.38
33248.74
31920.98
35248.54
38733.46
31212.33
37116.3
37015.4
35727.89
37429.34
30600.08
30606.95
37308.71
33556.29
30168.43
32470.51

0.017275
0.018423
0.019762
0.020521
0.02182
0.022632
0.022647
0.022894
0.022909
0.023114
0.02315
0.024731
0.025021
0.025142
0.025334
0.026241
0.027031
0.028544
0.029733
0.030443
0.030495
0.030803
0.031134
0.032396
0.03293
0.033508
0.033653
0.034137
0.034198
0.034647
0.035588
0.035719
0.036334
0.036387
0.037117
0.037509
0.038531
0.038796
0.03939
0.039498
0.040276
0.041049
0.041692
0.042649
0.042746
0.04297
0.044383
0.045263
0.045845
0.047725
0.047893

Asheville, NC
New Orleans, LA
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH/KY/IN
York, PA
Spokane, WA
Elkhart-Goshen, IN
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN
Fayetteville, NC
Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point, NC
Dayton-Springfield, OH
Fresno, CA
Appleton-Oskosh-Neenah, WI
Birmingham, AL
Yakima, WA
Sioux Falls, SD
State College, PA
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY
Athens, GA
Little Rock--North Little Rock, AR
Bakersfield, CA
Lakeland-Winterhaven, FL
Kokomo, IN
Springfield, IL
Louisville, KY/IN
Pittsburgh, PA
Wichita, KS
Ocala, FL
Kileen-Temple, TX
Jackson, MS
Cedar Rapids, IA
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI
Jackson, MI
Biloxi-Gulfport, MS
Tyler, TX
Clarksville- Hopkinsville, TN/KY
Sioux City, IA/NE
Benton Harbor, MI
Fayetteville-Springdale, AR
Tulsa, OK
Merced, CA
Pueblo, CO
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson SC
Jacksonville, NC
Eau Claire, WI
Yuba City, CA
Pensacola, FL
Sheboygan, WI
Fort Wayne, IN
Toledo, OH/MI
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA
Peoria, IL

29905.74
29611.95
37125.43
31886.46
31396.95
32975.71
32496
27727.22
32968.43
33525.07
26400.66
33979.91
34560.63
25919.84
33423.83
31111.42
32703.02
31827.26
31263.36
26545.53
28077.17
34404.86
34403.17
35785.21
32515.76
32812.72
25824.02
28723.57
31900.38
35101.52
32821.18
32275.01
28555.5
30786.03
27947.97
29643.03
31828.24
28158.83
32452.94
24285.04
25764.25
31161.92
25722.61
29371.44
26722.65
28796.34
34787.58
33094.55
32716.15
23146.36
33346

31390.12
31093.11
38984.99
33490.59
32977.11
34646.94
34174.89
29169.54
34685.62
35305.95
27816.07
35829.42
36505.23
27388.5
35330.05
32903.18
34617.96
33709.53
33112.97
28122.33
29766.25
36498.88
36518.55
38015.79
34555.45
34871.91
27451.35
30544.92
33931.7
37342.66
34920.95
34351.12
30425.64
32843.83
29822.21
31633.48
33971.68
30096.75
34698.32
25973.69
27569.99
33396.48
27569.11
31493.31
28677.49
30926.57
37418.89
35612.56
35213.5
24919.9
35915.83

0.049635
0.050019
0.050089
0.050308
0.050328
0.050681
0.051664
0.052018
0.052086
0.053121
0.053613
0.05443
0.056267
0.056662
0.057032
0.057592
0.058556
0.05914
0.059162
0.0594
0.060159
0.060864
0.061488
0.062333
0.062729
0.062756
0.063016
0.063409
0.063677
0.063848
0.063976
0.064326
0.065491
0.066842
0.067062
0.067148
0.067344
0.068821
0.069189
0.069534
0.070087
0.071708
0.071785
0.072243
0.073153
0.073976
0.075639
0.076085
0.076334
0.076623
0.077066

New Bedford, MA
Waco, TX
Oklahoma City, OK
Topeka, KS
Fargo-Morehead, ND/MN
Chattanooga, TN/GA
Wausau, WI
Evansville, IN/KY
Baton Rouge, LA
LaCrosse, WI
Mobile, AL
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI
Jackson, TN
Montgomery, AL
Canton, OH
Hickory-Morgantown, NC
Columbia, MO
Tuscaloosa, AL
Lubbock, TX
Knoxville, TN
Columbus, GA/AL
Davenport, IA-Rock Island -Moline, IL
Flint, MI
Greenville, NC
Wichita Falls, TX
St. Cloud, MN
Auburn-Opekika, AL
Yuma, AZ
Huntsville, AL
Muncie, IN
Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange,TX
Roanoke, VA
Macon-Warner Robins, GA
Billings, MT
Hagerstown, MD
Springfield, MO
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC
Goldsboro, NC
Amarillo, TX
Decatur, IL
Lake Charles, LA
Monroe, LA
Utica-Rome, NY
Erie, PA
Longview-Marshall, TX
Mansfield, OH
Abilene, TX
Binghamton, NY
Odessa, TX
El Paso, TX
Rocky Mount, NC

31271.67
29352.35
30862.54
31721.66
33548.76
32081.63
32489.85
32559.77
31183.34
34183.65
28130.21
31386.66
30507.69
31185.29
30242.19
28170.19
33155.13
30058.36
31212.24
30461.5
29505.53
31681.31
28358.23
30216.54
28037.92
31913.62
30647.94
22278.95
34406.28
29209.46
28093.2
31772.61
29467.5
30643.27
29961.08
28736.26
30384.05
27127.99
29573.3
31643.43
29620.86
27984.93
27671.59
28233.96
28698.81
28688.1
27249.56
30542.42
28770.84
22778.71
26769.07

33702.01
31654.29
33289.41
34262.81
36243.2
34659.54
35136.48
35213.92
33727.48
36979.45
30431.66
33974.64
33027.63
33765.91
32755.95
30522.96
35941.18
32594.16
33856.98
33084.84
32055.37
34429.66
30818.55
32850.9
30484.03
34732.34
33356.53
24251.76
37491.35
31871.53
30685.27
34716.59
32201.09
33494.16
32771.91
31453.17
33264.34
29750.23
32437.88
34791.23
32614.64
30828.65
30505.45
31133.81
31655.51
31644.43
30057.68
33696.98
31756.73
25148.91
29555.19

0.077717
0.078424
0.078635
0.080108
0.080314
0.080355
0.08146
0.081516
0.081587
0.081788
0.081814
0.082455
0.0826
0.082751
0.083121
0.08352
0.084031
0.084363
0.084734
0.08612
0.086419
0.08675
0.086759
0.087183
0.087243
0.088323
0.088378
0.088551
0.089666
0.091137
0.092267
0.092658
0.092766
0.093035
0.093816
0.094546
0.094796
0.096662
0.096864
0.099477
0.10107
0.101616
0.102411
0.102708
0.103025
0.103051
0.103052
0.103284
0.103782
0.104053
0.10408

Laredo, TX
Albany, GA
Lafayette, LA
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA
Jamestown-Dunkirk, NY
Shreveport, LA
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA
Lima, OH
Terre Haute, IN
Houma-Thibodoux, LA
Sharon, PA
St. Joseph, MO
Lynchburg, VA
Las Cruces, NM
Williamsport, PA
Joplin, MO
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX
Duluth-Superior, MN/WI
Fort Smith, AR/OK
Johnson City-Kingsport--Bristol, TN/VA
Sumter, SC
Altoona, PA
Alexandria, LA
Hattiesburg, MS
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-Mission, TX
Florence, AL
Decatur, AL
Danville, VA
Dothan, AL
Gadsden, AL
Anniston, AL
Johnstown, PA

18744.58
28972.03
29112.28
29253.43
26639.57
28185.75
30618.42
28299.33
29920.39
28164.12
25445.98
25922
28889.18
28828.97
22696.38
27282.75
25723.08
20188.49
30147.57
25907.08
26775.52
24520.5
25819.88
25603.93
27421.94
17514.82
26761.77
28988.35
24925.41
25950.78
25311.26
25777.07
23383.64

20710.54
32014.88
32195.21
32409.53
29576.42
31380.35
34106.91
31533.73
33359.2
31409.31
28455.34
29019.32
32359.76
32316.65
25466.04
30626.77
28897.53
22689.15
33907.75
29178.6
30171.94
27750.28
29271.94
29047.51
31294.43
20035.72
30614.56
33281.12
28645.14
29873.63
29179.26
29927.03
27495.83

0.104882
0.105027
0.105898
0.107888
0.110244
0.113341
0.113934
0.114293
0.114932
0.115225
0.118265
0.119486
0.120134
0.120978
0.122031
0.122569
0.123409
0.123866
0.124726
0.126279
0.126848
0.131717
0.133698
0.134494
0.141219
0.14393
0.143966
0.148086
0.149234
0.151165
0.152818
0.160994
0.175858

Table 2: Changes in the Cost of Living, by Education Group
1980 1990 2000

Percent
Increase
1980-2000
(4)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Official CPI
High-School
College
Percent Difference

1
1
0

1.53
1.53
0

2.02
2.02
0

102%
102%

Monthly Rent
High-School
College
Percent Difference

247
259
4%

432
491
11%

563
642
14%

127%
147%

Local CPI 1
High-School
College
Percent Difference

0.99
1.01
2%

1.49
1.58
4%

1.95
2.07
6%

96%
105%

Local CPI 2
High-School
College
Percent Difference

0.98
1.01
3%

1.57
1.71
7%

2.04
2.22
9%

108%
119%

Notes: Monthly rent refers to the rent paid for a two or three bedroom apartment. Local
CPI 1 allows for local variation only in the cost of housing. Local CPI 2 allows for local
variation both in the cost of housing and the cost of non-housing goods and services.

Table 3: Nominal and Real Conditional Wage Difference Between Workers with a High School Degree and Workers With College or
More, by Year - Baseline Estimates

Model 1
Nominal Wage Difference

Model 2
Real Wage Difference - Local CPI 1

1980

1990

2000

1980-2000
Increase

1980

1990

2000

1980-2000
Increase

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

.40
.53
.60
(.011) (.012) (.013)

.20

.35
.47
.53
(.007) (.006) (.007)

.18

.38
.48
.53
(.010) (.008) (.008)

.15

.37
.46
.52
(.008) (.006) (.007)

.15

Percent of Nominal Increase
Accounted for by Cost of Living
Model 3
Real Wage Difference - Local CPI 2

25%

.37
.45
.51
(.009) (.008) (.008)

Percent of Nominal Increase
Accounted for by Cost of Living

MSA Fixed Effects

.14

17%

.37
.46
.51
(.008) (.006) (.007)

30%

No

No

No

.14
22%

Yes

Yes

Yes

Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the log of nominal hourly
wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, where real hourly wage is the ratio of nominal wage and Local
CPI 1. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the log of real hourly wage, where real hourly wage is the ratio of nominal wage and Local
CPI 2. All models include dummies for gender and race, a cubic in potential experience, and year effects. Models in columns 5 to 8
also include MSA fixed effects. Sample size is 5,024,221.

Table 4: The Relation between Share of College Graduates and College Premium

College Share
R2

2000
Cross-section
OLS
(1)
.375
(.031)
.30

1980-2000 Change
OLS
(2)
.388
(.070)
.10

IV
(3)
.371
(.106)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in column 1 is the cityspecific college premium, defined as the city-specific difference in the log of hourly wage
for college graduates and high school graduates conditional on gender, a cubic in potential
experience, race and year. The dependent variable in columns 2 and 3 is the change in the
city-specific college premium. Entries are the coefficient on college share in column 1 and
change in college share in columns 2 and 3. All models are weighted by city size.

Figure 1: The Distribution of Average Rental Costs Across Metropolitan Areas: 2000 CrossSection and 1980-2000 Change
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Notes: The top panel shows the distribution of the average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom
apartment in year 2000. The bottom panel shows the distribution of the changes between
1980 and 2000 in the average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom apartment.

Figure 2: Share of College Graduates and College Premium, by City
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Notes: The top panel plots estimates of the city-specific college premium in 2000 against the
share of college graduates in 2000. The bottom panel plots the 1980-2000 change in college
premium against the 1980-2000 change in the share of college graduates.

Figure 3: Share of College Graduates and Relative Demand Shocks, by City
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Notes: The panel plots changes in the share of college graduates 1980-2000 on the y-axis
against 1980-2000 shocks to the relative demand of college graduates due to 1980 differences
in industry mix on the x-axis. Shocks to the relative demand are defined in equation 25.

Appendix Table 1: Relative Importance of the Main Aggregate Components in
the BLS Consumer Price Index (CPI-U)
Housing
Shelter
Fuels and Utilities
Other Housing
Transportation
Food and Beverages
Medical Care
Education and Communication
Recreation
Apparel
Other Goods and Services

42.7%
32.8%
5.3%
4.6%
17.2%
14.9%
6.2%
6.0%
5.5%
3.7%
3.5%

Notes: Entries are the share of the main aggregate components of the CPI-U. For more
disaggregated categories see Appendix 4 in Chapter 17 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s
“Handbook of Methods” (2007).

